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JAMES W. KELLEHER 
A. ZONINC 
§20.1. Judicial review: Effect of local ordinances and special acts. 
While the general system of appeals is established by statute, recent de-
cisions emphasize that the local ordinance involved must be read with 
care, since it may control the scope of the appeal in important respects. 
Thus the ordinance may, though it need not, give a right of appeal to 
the local board to a person objecting to the grant of a permit,! as well 
as to a person denied a permit. It was held in Massachusetts Leather 
Co. v. Aldermen of Chelsea 2 that the appeal is the exclusive remedy. 
The Court held that the ordinance may be so drawn as to give to a local 
board established under General Laws, Chapter 40, Section 30, exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals under the building law as well as under the 
zoning law, thus ousting a previous board of jurisdiction. 
In another case decided during the survey year, Fairman v. Board of 
Appeal of Melrose,3 the local board of appeal was established by special 
act with no such review provisions contained therein as in the general 
act referred to above. The Court therefore asserted that the only form 
of judicial review was by petition for writ of certiorari. 
§20.2. Judicial review: Denial of a variance. The statutory pro-
vision governing appeals to the Superior Court from decisions of local 
boards has given rise to much litigation. The appeal is by bill in equity 
brought by "Any person aggrieved ... whether or not previously a 
party ... " and the court is required to "hear all pertinent evidence 
and determine the facts, and upon the facts so determined, annul such 
decision if found to exceed the authority of such board, or make such 
other decree as justice and equity may require." 1 In Bicknell Realty 
Co. v. Board of Appeal of Boston,2 in dealing with the scope of review 
jA:\1ES W. KELLEHER is associated with the law firm of Dever and Proctor, Boston. 
He was formerly First Assistant Corporation Counsel of the City of Boston. 
§20.1. 1 C.L., c. 40, §30, sixth paragraph. See now C.L., c. 40A, §13. 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 120 N.E.2d 766. 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 173, 117 N.E.2d 829. 
§20.2. 1 C.L., Co 40, §30. Section 21 of the new Chapter 40A, inserted by Acts of 
1954, Co 368, §2, contains an identical provision, 
',130 ;\lass. 676, 679, 116 N,E.2d 570,573 (1954). 
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under this statute, the Court said, " ... the matter is heard de novo 
and the judge makes his own findings of fact, independent of any find-
ings of the board, and determines the legal validity of the decision of 
the board upon the facts found by the court, or if the decision of the 
board is invalid in whole or in part, the Court determines what decision 
the law requires upon the facts found." 
Further questions arise in applying the rule just stated. Suppose a 
person applies to the building inspector for a permit knowing that he 
is bound to deny it, and then appeals to the local board seeking a vari-
ance or special permit. It may happen that the board grants a variance, 
and that on appeal the facts found by the Superior Court justify its 
action. Or the facts there found may show that the action of the board 
was wrong as a matter of law. In either case the "decision the law re-
quires upon the facts found" is clear. But suppose the facts found in 
the Superior Court would require affirmance of the action of the board 
had it granted the variance, whereas in fact the board has denied it. 
What decree is to be entered? The contention that in such a case the 
Superior Court may grant a variance was rejected in the very significant 
case of Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable.S The Supreme 
Judicial Court held that the statutory authority to "make such other 
decree as justice and equity may require" did not give to the Superior 
Court the same power to grant variances that the local board possesses, 
intimating that the grant of such a power to the court would involve 
grave constitutional doubts.4 The court's duty is to apply the law to 
the facts found by it, and while the law may permit, it does not compel, 
the grant of a variance. No one is entitled to a variance as of right. 
The Court stated that the same rule applied to a special permit or spe-
cial exception, since the local board also had discretion in granting 
those. The Court, however, left open the case where the denial of a 
variance is capricious or arbitrary, "if such a case can arise." 5 
§20.3. Zoning Enabling Act. Chapter 368 of the Acts of 1954 
strikes out Sections 25 to 30B inclusive of Chapter 40 of the General 
Laws, and inserts a new Chapter 40A, to be known as "The Zoning 
Enabling Act." For the most part, the new chapter consists of a re-
arrangement, without substantial change, of the provisions stricken out, 
and it is provided that the new chapter, so far as it contains the same 
provisions as General Laws, Chapter 40, Sections 25 to 30B inclusive, is 
to be construed as a continuation of those provisions, and that the new 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 633, 120 N.E.2d 916. In several previous cases involving an 
appeal from the denial of a variance the Supreme Judicial Court merely held, on the 
facts found by the Superior Court, that the local board had committed no error, 
without adverting to the present question. Vetter v. Zoning Board of Appeal of 
Attleboro, 330 Mass. 628, 1I6 N.E.2d 277 (1953); Raimondo v. Board of Appeal of 
Bedford, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 271, 1I8 N.E.2d 740 (denial of special permit). 
41954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 633, 634, 120 N.E.2d 916, 917. The doubts referred to by the 
Court apparently would arise under the provision of the Massachusetts Constitution 
prohibiting the exercise of executive or legislative powers by the judiciary. Mass. 
Const., Declaration of Rights, Pt. I, Art. XXX. 
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enactment shall not affect the validity of any action lawfully taken 
under the old. l General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 2 provides that 
an ordinance or by-law may regulate "the location and use of buildings, 
structures and land for trade, industry, agriculture, residence or other 
purposes," the word "agriculture" being added to the former provisions. 
Section 2 also authorizes local regulations providing that "lands deemed 
subject to seasonal or periodic flooding shall not be used for residence 
or other purposes in such a manner as to endanger the health or safety 
of the occupants thereof." 
Section 3 of the new chapter provides that local regulations may be 
designed to conserve "the value of land and buildings," the word "land" 
being new in this context. 
Section 4 regulates more comprehensively than the former statute the 
power to provide by local ordinance or by-law for the granting by the 
board of appeal of "exceptions." Provision may be made for excep-
tions which (1) " ... shall be applicable to all of the districts of a par-
ticular class and of a character set forth in such ordinance or by-law"; 
and (2) " ... shall be in harmony with the general purpose and intent 
of the ordinance or by-law and may be subject to general or specific 
rules therein contained." Exceptions are to be made available by "spe-
cial permits." Local regulation may provide for the granting of such 
special permits by the city councilor selectmen, as well as by the board 
of appeal. No public hearing is required, unless the ordinance so pro-
vides, where the permit is to be granted by the city councilor select-
men, but apparently a hearing is still required by the statute where the 
permit is to be granted by the board of appeal.2 
Section 11 slightly alters the status of permits issued or work com-
menced before notice of a hearing with respect to a proposed zoning 
change, by providing that the work shall not be immune to the zoning 
change unless begun within six months from the issuance of the permit 
and unless continuously prosecuted to completion in good faith so far 
as is reasonably practicable. Permits issued or work begun after notice 
of a proposed change are subject to the change when adopted if the 
adoption takes place in the usual sequence of steps without unreason-
able delay. 
Section 12 continues the former provision prohibiting the grant of 
permits for buildings and uses in violation of the local regulation, and 
further authorizes a town having no municipal building law to provide 
by by-law that " ... no building shall be erected, externally altered or 
changed in use ... without a permit from the selectmen," who are 
§20.3. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 368, §3. 
2 The precise language is, "Before granting such a special permit the board of 
appeals, or the city councilor the selectmen if the ordinance or by-law so provides, 
shall hold a public hearing ... " The punctuation seems to indicate that the phrase 
"if the ordinance or by-law so provides" is intended to apply to action by the city 
councilor selectmen, not to action of the board of appeal. Further, C.L., c. 40A, 
§15 continues in identical words the former provision of C.L., c. 40, §30, giving to 
the board of appeal the "power" (duty?) " ... to hear and decide applications for 
special permits ... " (Emphasis supplied.) 
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prohibited by the statute from issuing a permit for any construction 
or use not in conformity with the zoning by-law. 
Section 15 changes the provision with respect to variances, so that a 
variance may now be granted not only with respect to a particular 
parcel of land but also with respect to an "existing building" thereon, 
where conditions exist especially affecting such building. 
Section 17, in continuing the former provision with respect to notice 
of hearings to be given by the board of appeal, requires in addition that 
notice be sent to the planning board. By the terms of Section 18, notice 
of the board's decision must be sent to the planning board and to any 
person present at the hearing who so requests and gives an address to 
which notice may be sent. It will be observed that neither provision 
seems to apply to the granting of "special permits" in cases where the 
local regulation provides for such grant by the city councilor selectmen 
and does not require a hearing (General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 4, 
discussed supra). 
B. M UNICIP AL EMPLOYEES 
§20A. Time for appeal to Civil Service Commission. By a familiar 
rule of construction, when the time limited by statute for the per-
formance of an act is less than seven days, Sunday is to be excluded 
from the computation. The Supreme Judicial Court refused to apply 
the rule in Iannelle v. Fire Commissioners of Boston} involving an 
appeal to the Civil Service Commission from an order discharging an 
employee. The appeal was filed on the sixth day, the second being a 
Sunday, whereas General Laws, Chapter 31, Section 43(b) allows five 
days. The Court pointed out that other time limitations of less than 
one week contained in Section 43 are expressly qualified by the words 
"exclusive of Sundays and holidays," and concludes that no such quali-
fication was intended in the five-day appeal provision. 
§20.5. Overtime. A recent case, City of Boston v. Cosgrove,! in-
volves the provision of General Laws, Chapter 149, Section 33B, that 
authorized service by an employee in excess of forty hours in one week 
"shall be compensated for as overtime." The Court decided that the 
granting of "compensatory time off" did not satisfy the statute, and that 
the legislature intended that monetary compensation be given. 
§20.6. Back pay. Pay increases retroactive for short periods are 
not infrequently granted to municipal employees. Some doubt appears 
at first sight to be cast upon this practice by the decision in Eisenstadt 
v. County of SufJolk,l holding that the legislature exceeded its power in 
granting a retroactive pay increase to a special judge of a Distr1ct Court. 
Both the original and the increased compensation, however, were per 
diem, and the Court points out that the statute involved validly fixed 
§20A. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 277, lIS N.E.2d 757. 
§20.5. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 721, 121 N.E.2d 719. 
§20.6. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 651, 120 N.E.2d 924. 
4













§20.8 MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 211 
the yearly compensation of the judge of the court as of a date prior to 
its passage. It would seem that the retroactive fixing of yearly salaries 
of municipal employees is not per se invalid though it involves, in one 
sense, additional payment for services already rendered and paid for. 
In an instructive case of this type, Gediman v. Commissioner of Public 
Works of Boston,2 the plaintiff recovered back pay from April 2, 1952, 
under a municipal compensation plan approved on December 3, 1952, 
funds for payment having been appropriated on November 13, 1952. 
§20.7. Pensions. Lenox v. City of Medford 1 involved the effect of 
a statute authorizing a city auditor to disallow a claim as "fraudulent, 
unlawful or excessive." The plaintiff, the widow of a police officer, 
sued in contract to collect an annuity granted after a finding by a medi-
cal panel that death was service-connected. It was held that disallow-
ance by the auditor is no defense, as he has no power to revise the find-
ings of other administrative officers. The express power to "disallow" 
conferred upon the auditor is probably justified by the fact that he may 
be absolutely liable on his bond for payments upon obligations which 
turn out to be "unlawful." Where there is any possible question of the 
legality of a payment, he should be entitled to have the claim passed 
upon by a court and reduced to judgment, since, short of this, he may 
be held liable for approving the payment. 
§20.8. Classification. Unless positions are properly classified in ac-
cordance with the duties attached to them, difficulties arise in appoint-
ment and promotion and in the establishment of a rational scheme of 
compensation. When it is sought to classify for the first time a large 
number of municipal employees, two basic problems arise: (1) the estab-
lishment and definition of a system of positions which will adequately 
serve the needs of the municipality; and (2) the assignment of existing 
employees to positions so established. General Laws, Chapter 31, Sec-
tion 2A(b) places both problems within the jurisdiction of the Civil 
Service Department of the Commonwealth, by the provision that the 
Director of Civil Service shall "Establish, with the approval of the com-
mission, classification plans for positions in every city and town which 
are subject to any provision of this chapter," and the further provision 
that the Director shall, "Upon the establishment of such classifica-
tion plan ... make such plan effective ... " (Emphasis supplied.) 
Within one year the municipality is required to establish a correspond-
ing compensation plan. 
In Gediman v. Public Works Commissioner of Boston 1 a classifica-
tion plan was recommended by the Director on June 12, 1952, and 
"established" by vote of the Commission on July 22, 1952. The plan 
contained ~no names of employees, and provided for "allocation" by the 
Director of existing employees to the positions it listed, subject to ap-
peal (to the Commission) in individual cases. On June 23, 1952, the 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 121 N.E.2d 893. 
§20.7. '330 Mass. 593, 116 N.E.2d 663 (1953). 
§20.8. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 121 N.E.2d 893. 
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Director purported to allocate many employees, including Gediman, to 
positions under the plan.2 Gediman asked for review by the Director 
(pursuant to a provision of the plan), and as a result, the Director on 
November 28, 1952, allocated him to the higher position of "head 
clerk." The respondent Commissioner's appeal to the Civil Service 
Commission was dismissed because it was taken too late. 
It was held that a writ of mandamus should issue commanding the 
respondent to conform to the Director's order of November 28, 1952. 
The Court rejected the contention that the vote of July 22 establishing 
the plan was void in failing to assign existing employees to positions, 
holding that such assignment was to be accomplished by the Director 
in making the plan "effective." The Court thus distinguished sharply 
between the functions of Commission and Director, and recognized 
expressly that a classification plan cannot normally be "established" 
and made "effective" at a single instant of time, since assignment of in-
dividual employees in a city like Boston "would be a long and compli-
cated process," 3 involving appeals to the Commission and possible 
judicial review by way of certiorari. 
Further questions with respect to this difficult subject are suggested 
but not settled by the decision. Part of the difficulty in administration 
of the system arises from the reluctance of many employees to give up 
their existing titles, because they suppose that the new titles will render 
it less easy for them to transfer into other departments if they should de-
sire to do so. Another source of trouble is the fact that many employees 
are found to be working "out of grade," i.e., doing work for which they 
have not previously been certified by Civil Service. In numerous cases 
the Boston plan provides for assignment to a new position only if the 
employee succeeds in a qualifying or competitive examination. In view 
of the Gediman decision, there seems to be little doubt that the power 
to classify implies a certain power to alter the duties of the employee as 
they appear on his previous civil service record in a proper case. But if 
the power be exercised it would seem that other employees whose rela-
tive grade is affected should have an opportunity to be heard. 
TAXPAYERS' PROCEEDINCS 
§20.9. Burden of proof. In addition to the familiar proceeding 
to enjoin illegal appropriations or expenditures,! a number of other 
statutory proceedings may be brought by "taxable inhabitants." 2 In 
a significant decision, Howe v. Town of Ware} it was held that the peti-
tioners in such a proceeding have the burden of showing that they live 
2 The Court apparently accepted, without comment, the petitioner's argument that 
the purported allocation of June 23 was void since the plan itself was not established 
until July 22. 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 759, 121 N.E.2d at 895. 
§20.9. 1 C.L., c. 40, §53. 
2 See, e.g., C.L., c. 35, §35; c. 44, §59; c. 45, §7; c. 71, §34; c. 164, §69; c. 214, §3(1I). 
8330 Mass. 487, 1I5 N.E.2d 455 (1953). The case was brought under C.L., c. 71, §34. 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1954 [1954], Art. 26
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1954/iss1/26
§20.9 MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 213 
within the territorial limits of the municipality and are subject to a 
local tax assessment. The testimony of the town clerk that the names 
of ten petitioners appeared on the tax lists of the assessors was held in· 
admissible, the lists being the best evidence, and it was pointed out that 
the lists themselves would not be evidence that the petitioners owned 
property or lived in the town. 
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